Abstract-In addition of monitoring the environment of interest, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system can be utilized to actively monitor possible suspicious wireless communications in vicinity. To this end, we propose a proactive eavesdropping scheme wherein a full-duplex (FD) monitor eavesdrops suspicious communication while sending the collected information to the UAV. Our objective is to maximize the eavesdropping capability, while satisfying a certain quality-of-service requirement in a UAV network. In the case where FD monitor is equipped with single transmit/receive antennas, we propose semi-analytical solutions for the UAV altitude and monitor transmit power, whereas in the case of multiple transmit and single receive antennas, a joint optimization problem to determine the transmit beamformer, UAV altitude, and monitor transmit power is efficiently solved using semi-definite relaxation approach. Simulation results show that significant performance improvements can be achieved through optimization. Moreover, achievable performance gains highly depend on the system parameters such as the user zone, maximum monitor transmission power, and the strength of the residual self-interference.
I. INTRODUCTION
Proliferation of wireless systems, both authorized and unauthorized (suspicious), has caused wireless security to become an active topic for research. The necessity to monitor activities of unauthorized wireless devices and systems has increased recently, especially in the wake of threats made against public security [1] . Such developments have created a new paradigm shift in wireless security to consider active eavesdropping and legitimate intervention via techniques such as jamming or spoofing [2] , [3] .
On the other hand, full-duplex (FD) technology has emerged as an attractive solution to improve the spectrum utilization in next generation communication systems [4] . FD operation can theoretically double the spectral efficiency of commonly used half-duplex (HD) communication systems at the expense of the self-interference (SI) effect [5] , [6] . For example, large power differential that exists between the transmit and receive sides of an FD transceiver can cause significant performance degradation for the decoded signal. However, significant strides to mitigate the SI have been made through the development of advanced antenna technologies, electronics and efficient This work was supported in part by the UK EPSRC under Grant EP/N007840/1, and by the European Union H2020-MSCA-RISE-2015 under Grant 690750.
signal processing techniques, and thus FD has become a practical solution.
As evident from the recent literature in these areas, there exists a growing body of papers that have studied active eavesdropping of suspicious communication links using a legitimate monitor. In [7] and [8] , surveillance performance of single/multi-antenna relay communication links with amplify-and-forward and decode-and-forward protocols has been investigated. In [9] , an average monitoring rate maximization problem with Gaussian approximated mutual information rates for a point-to-point suspicious source/destination and legitimate monitor system with multiple antennas has been studied. A common feature of all the systems considered in [7] - [9] is that they operate on the HD mode, while recently the performance of a multiantenna FD monitor has been studied in [3] . FD operation is especially useful for active eavesdropping since reception and jamming can be performed simultaneously. Moreover, the results in [3] have shown that compared to single antenna case, use of multiple antennas can significantly improve the eavesdropping non-outage probability.
In this paper, we consider a system consisting of an UAV and a FD monitor, where the monitor's main task is to transmit information (e.g., sensor data, audio/video data of the environment) to the overhead UAV node. UAVs have found civilian and military use, including reconnaissance, border patrol, traffic control, forest fire monitoring [10] , and recently in cellular communications [11] , [12] . UAVs are also deployed to provide assistance at the scene of emergency, natural disaster, and accidents. In addition to these applications, this paper proposes the deployment of UAVs for monitoring suspicious (or adversary) communications, for e.g., a very common situation encountered in a battlefield environment. As such, the FD monitor pro-actively eavesdrops suspicious communications, while ensuring a certain quality of service requirement at the UAV node. We consider single transmit/receive antenna FD monitor and single receive/multiple transmit antenna FD monitor cases and solve the optimization problems to enhance the eavesdropping non-outage probability of the system. Specifically, our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• For a single transmit/receive antenna FD monitor case, we provide semi-analytical solutions for the joint optimization of UAV altitude and FD monitor transmit 978-1-5386-4328-0/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE power.
• In the case of single receive/multiple transmit antenna FD monitor, a complicated non-convex joint optimization problem of FD monitor beamforming, power allocation, and the UAV altitude is transformed to a semi-definite relaxation (SDR) problem in terms of a transmit beamformer. The corresponding solutions are obtained by solving the SDR problem in conjunction with line searches over the monitor power and UAV altitude.
• As suboptimum designs, we employ zero-forcing (ZF) and maximum ratio transmission (MRT) schemes for obtaining transmit beamformer. We compare the eavesdropping non-outage probability of the proposed and suboptimum designs to highlight the gains of the proposed design for different system parameters, such as the number of monitor transmit antennas, level of the residual SI at the FD monitor, and the peak power constraint at the monitor. Notation: Bold upper case and bold lower case letters are used to denote matrices and vectors, respectively.
H stand for transpose, conjugate, and conjugate transpose, respectively; the Euclidean norm of the vector and the expectation are denoted by · and E {·}, respectively; Pr(·) denotes the probability; CN (µ, σ 2 ) denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable x with mean µ and variance σ 2 .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an unauthorized communication scenario in which a suspicious transmitter is located at the center of the cell and its coverage area is a disc of radius R 1 as shown in Fig. 1 . The transmitter serves a group of single antenna HD users {U i }, i = 1, · · · , N u , randomly distributed according to a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) Φ u with density λ u on the disk, denoted by D u . The transmitter randomly selects a user for information transmission 1 . In addition, on the ground, we assume that there is an FD monitor equipped with N T ≥ 1 transmit and single receive antennas at a fixed location in the coverage area, that actively eavesdrops communication between the transmitter and scheduled user. At the same time, the FD monitor performs information transmission to a single antenna UAV. Thus, FD monitor acts as interference to the scheduled user in the unauthorized network. The interference lowers the rate of the suspicious transmitter-to-user link and improves the probability of the successful eavesdropping. We assume that the receiver structure of the scheduled user is different from the UAV and hence, the user is incapable of decoding and canceling FD monitor's signal [11] .
In the sequel, we will use subscript-S for the transmitter, subscript-U for the scheduled user, subscript-E for the FD monitor, and subscript-A for the UAV. A polar coordinate system with the origin at the cell center is considered, so that the location of U and E can be described by (r U , θ U ) and (r E , θ E ), respectively. We denote the polar coordinates of the projection of UAV onto the ground plane by (r A , θ A ) and the height of the UAV by h A . 1 The analysis of other user scheduling schemes is also possible and not presented due to space limitations. 
A. Channel Model
For a realistic propagation model, we assume that the ground-to-ground links experience large-scale path loss effects as well as small-scale fading. The ground-to-ground channels experience quasi-static Rayleigh fading where each element of these complex fading channel coefficients are circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variables. The bounded path loss model ℓ xy = 1 1+ x−y α is used for the ground-to-ground channels [13] , where α ≥ 2 is the path loss exponent.
On the other hand, we assume that the ground-to-air channels are dominated by line-of-sight (LoS) propagation 2 . The LoS model is an acceptable approximation widely considered in the current literature to model the practical ground-to-air and air-to-ground communication channels [14] , [15] . Under the LoS model, the channel power gain is determined by the corresponding link distance. For example, the received power from the transmitter at the UAV is given by
is the link distance between the transmitter and UAV. Also,
, where f c and c denote the carrier frequency and the speed of light, respectively.
B. Signal Model
The received signal at the scheduled user can be written as
where x S is the transmit signal, f SU ∼ CN (0, 1) is the channel between the transmitter and scheduled user, w t and x E are the transmit beamforming vector and signal at the FD monitor, f EU ∈ C N T ×1 is the channel between E and U and its entries follow identically independent distributed (i.i.d), CN (0, 1), and n U is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the scheduled user with E n U n
and hence P S and P E are the average transmit powers of the transmitter and FD monitor, respectively. Also,
On the other hand, the received signal at the FD monitor is given by
where f SE ∼ CN (0, 1) is the channel between the transmitter and FD monitor and f EE ∈ C N T ×1 is the residual SI channel. The strong LoS component of the SI channel can be effectively removed with the application of an SI suppression technique and hence f EE can be modeled as
and n E is the AWGN at the FD monitor with E n E n
Similarly, received signal at the UAV can be expressed as
where the N T × 1 vector g EA (h A ) is the LoS channel between the FD monitor and UAV whose entries are static and equal to
SA is the LoS channel between the transmitter and UAV, and n A is the AWGN at UAV with E n A n
Invoking (1) and (2), signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR) at the scheduled user and FD monitor can be written as
and
respectively. Moreover, SINR at the UAV can be expressed as
Therefore, the achievable rates for the S-U and S-E links can be established as C U = log 2 (1 + SINR U ) and C E = log 2 (1 + SINR E ), respectively. Accordingly, when C E ≥ C U , the FD monitor can decode the transmitter signal (or successfully eavesdrops the transmitter to the scheduled user link), otherwise FD monitor cannot correctly decode the transmitter signal. Hence, it is standard to measure eavesdropping capability in terms of the non-outage probability as [3] , [16] 
From (4), (5), and (7), it is clear that P no is dependent on the transmit power and beamformer at the FD monitor, but is independent of P S . Moreover, from (6), SINR A is a function of the UAV altitude and transmit power of the FD monitor. In the sequel, we assume block fading for ground-to-ground channels, i.e., channels remain constant for a block of symbols and change independently from one block to another. Since block length is larger than channel coherence time, it is sufficient to update P E and h A once in each block. Moreover, we assume that global channel state information (CSI) (see similar assumptions in [3] and Section III, [16] )) is available at the FD monitor 3 . As such, the reported results of this work represent upper bound for the performance of practical systems in which only imperfect or partial CSI of ground-to-ground channels may be available 4 . Under these assumptions, the maximization of P no can be approximated via maximization of X for each fading state. As it will be clear in the sequel, a main advantage of this approach is that UAV altitude and monitor power can be optimized without requiring CSI of some channels associated with adversary communication system (e.g., CSI of S − U and S − E channels), which is an important advantage since it is not easy to make the CSI of S − U channel available at the FD monitor.
III. SINGLE ANTENNA FD MONITOR
In this section, we start with a single-input single-output (SISO) system in which the FD monitor is equipped with one receive and one transmit antenna, respectively. In this case, the beamformer vector, w t , is given by w t = 1.
A. UAV Altitude and Monitor Power Optimization
Our main objective in the SISO case is to optimize the UAV altitude and monitor transmit power so that SINR E SINR U is maximized, given a targeted SINR constraint at the UAV, γ t . The optimization problem can be formulated as
where P E,max is the maximum monitor transmission power, h min is the minimum altitude of the UAV that ensures LoS communications, and h max is the maximum allowed UAV altitude [14] . The problem in (8) can be re-expressed as
The factor
in the objective function of (9) does not affect the optimization problem and hence (9) can be further expressed as
where
. In order to solve the joint optimization problem, we first keep h A fixed and optimize over P E . We then solve the resulting optimization problem w.r.t. h A . The final result of this optimization is presented below.
Proposition 1. Let P
where h * A is any value that satisfies P E,max ≥
for aσ 2 E > bσ 2 U , and for aσ
where a 0 = r
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix.
IV. MISO FD MONITOR
We now consider a multiple-input single-output (MISO) FD monitor with N T > 1 and single receive antenna (i.e., N R = 1 ). With multiple transmit antennas at the FD monitor, beamforming can be implemented to improve eavesdropping non-outage probability since transmit beamformer affects SINR E as well as SINR U . Second, multiple transmit antennas can improve the quality of the link between the FD monitor and UAV.
A. Transmit beamformer, UAV Altitude and Monitor Power Optimization
Let us consider the joint optimization of transmit beamformer, altitude of the UAV, and transmission power of the FD monitor. The optimization problem can be expressed as
This is a complicated non-convex optimization problem. However, for a given h A ∈ [h min , h max ] and P E ∈ [0, P max ], the optimization problem w.r.t. w t is expressed as
. The objective function in (14) is in Rayleigh quotient form. Thus, it can be reformulated as
A closed-form solution of w t in (15) is not available. Moreover, it is a non-convex optimization problem. Introducinḡ W t =w tw H t and relaxing rank-one constraint ofw t , we obtain the following SDR optimization:
which can be solved using CVX software [17] . If the rank of optimumW t is rank-one, then it is also the optimum solution of the original problem (15) . Fortunately, utilizing a similar approach as in [18] , we can verify that rank-one optimum solution can always be recovered in (16) . The remaining optimization is solved using a two-dimensional search over P E and h A .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we evaluate the eavesdropping nonoutage probability of the considered system with 1) single antenna FD monitor and 2) MISO FD monitor. We consider a communication scenario in which the unauthorized transmitter is located in the center of the cell with radius R 1 , FD monitor is located at [15] . Fig. 2 shows the eavesdropping non-outage probability of the SISO system with the proposed and fixed designs for different values of R 1 versus residual SI strength, σ 2 EE . Specifically, in the fixed design, we use h = h min and P E = P E,max . In addition, in the proposed design, we obtain the altitude and transmit power using the proposed scheme in III-A while the threshold SINR at UAV, γ t , is set to the SINR value achieved by the UAV for the fixed design. The superiority of the proposed design, especially when the residual SI strength is between −60 dB and −40 dB, is evident. Also, the performance of both proposed and fixed designs degrade, when the residual SI strength is increased. Further, as R 1 is increased, it can be observed that the performance gap between the two designs increases. Fig. 3 shows the eavesdropping non-outage probability of the MISO system as a function of the residual SI strength when the proposed and suboptimal designs are employed. In both Case 1 and Case 2, the suboptimal design uses fixed h = h min and P E ≤ P E,max while in the former, ZF beamformer with w t = Ξf † EU
Ξf † EU
and in the latter, MRT with
is used as the beamformer at the FD monitor. For a fair comparison, SINR at the UAV due to the proposed and MRT beamformer designs are set as the SINR value achieved by the UAV for the ZF beamformer design. The proposed design significantly outperforms the MRT beamformer design in all regimes of residual SI strength. Moreover, the proposed design achieves up to 7% increase in average non-outage probability as compared to the suboptimal design with ZF beamforming. The performance of the proposed design and ZF beamformer design are identical when the residual SI strength is high (σ 2 EE > −50 dB). This is due to the fact that, when residual SI strength is high, both designs achieve the same SINR at the FD monitor.
We compare the eavesdropping non-outage probability of the SISO and MISO FD monitor cases with proposed design in Fig. 4 , where the non-outage probability is plotted as a function of P E,max for different N T . It can be observed that the MISO system significantly outperforms the SISO system. Also, as expected, the performance of the MISO system improves when N T is increased. In addition, increasing the transmit power at the FD monitor increases the non-outage probability in the MISO case. However, in the SISO case, the effect of FD monitor transmit power on the non-outage performance largely depends on the residual SI strength.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered FD monitor operation of an UAV wireless system to investigate proactive eavesdropping performance. In order to maximize the eavesdropping non-outage probability subject to a SINR threshold at the UAV, we considered joint optimization of the UAV height, transmit power, and beamfomer design at the FD monitor. Our results indicate that the proposed design can substantially improve the system performance. Moreover, for a predefined SINR threshold at the UAV, proposed design can achieve up to 7% average non-outage probability gain compared to the ZF-based design for low-to-medium values of residual SI strength. Note that c does not depend on P E and is fixed for a given h A . For the feasibility of the problem (10), c ≤ P E,max is required. The first order derivative of f (P E ) w.r.t.
If aσ
is monotonically increasing with P E . On the other hand, if aσ
is monotonically decreasing with P E . From those observations, the optimum P E in (10) is given by
Since the objective function (10) does not depend on height, when P * E = P E,max , h A should be chosen in such a way that P E,max ≥
. In this case, the optimum h A can be obtained from one-dimensional search over h A or using a bisection algorithm. When P * 
The objective function in (19) can be expressed as
On the other hand
A . Accordingly, using (21) and (22), we obtain
, the constraint, c ≤ P E,max , of the optimization problem (19) can be equivalently expressed as γ t ≤ P E,max f (h A ). Thus, the Lagrangian multiplier function for (19) can be expressed as
where λ ≥ 0, µ 1 ≥ 0, and µ 2 ≥ 0 are Lagrangian multipliers. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for (23) are
where the last three equations are due to complementary slackness conditions. After simple manipulations, (24) can be expressed as
Utilizing the complementary slackness conditions (25)-(27), we can analyze the possible values of µ 1 and µ 2 at optimality under different cases.
• Case 1 :µ 1 > 0 -Suppose that the optimum µ 1 > 0. In this case, h A = h min due to complementary slackness condition (26). Since h min = h max , h A = h max in this case. This means that µ 2 = 0 due to (27). Because µ 1 > 0 and µ 2 = 0, it is clear that df (h A ) dh A < 0 is required for (28) to be true as
df (h A ) + λP E,max > 0 for any λ ≥ 0.
• Case 2: µ 2 > 0 -Suppose that the optimum µ 2 > 0. In this case, h A = h max due to complementary slackness condition (27). Since h min = h max , h A = h min in this case. This means that µ 1 = 0 due to (26). Because µ 2 > 0 and µ 1 = 0, it is clear that df (h A ) dh A > 0 is required for (28) to be true as
df (h A ) + λP E,max > 0.
• Case 3: µ 1 = 0, µ 2 = 0 -In this case, the optimum h A ∈ (h min , h max ), and (28) will hold only if
Based upon these three cases, it is obvious that the optimum h A can be determined by solving 
Note that there exists no solution for h A in (29), if a 0 −a 1 < 0. In this case, df (h A ) dh A < 0 and as discussed in Case 1, the optimum h A is h min . Otherwise, (29) can be expressed as 
